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The undersigned, counsel of record for appellant-cross
appellee, certifies that the following parties appeared in the
court below:
1. Ann B. Hopkins;
2. Price Waterhouse.
Ms Hop ins seeks affirmance of the district court s
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Appeals from the United States District
for the District of Columbia
Court
ORIGINAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANT-CROSS APPELLEE
TATEME T OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether a woman who joined and continued to work for a firm
only on t e condition that she would be eligible for partnership
can be  enied equitable relief under Title VII because she left
tne frrm after she was rejecte  for partnership on account of her
sex, when she had been told that it was  very unlikely" she would
aver become partner and had been advised by a senior partner to
asign, an  where the regular practice at the firm was for
rejected  artnership can idates to resi n.
RULE 8(b) STATEMENT
This case was tried in t e United States District Court for
the District of Columbia as Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-
3040. Counsel are not aware of any related case which is pending
in this or any other court or that may be presented to this or
any other court in the future.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The governing statute in this case is Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et_ seq.
REFERENCE TO PARTIES AND RULINGS
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia (Judge Gesell) entered a Memorandum and Order herein on
September 20, 1985. The Memorandum appears at page 7 of the
Record Excerpts (hereafter, e.g., RE 7). The Order appears at RE
35. The decision is reported at 618 F.Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985).
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1/
1 • Plaintiff's Interest in Partnership
Ann Hopkins went to wor  at Price Waterhouse as a manager in
1978. S e specialized in securing and managing contracts for the
firm in the area of large scale, computer based information
systems.
Plaintiff had earlier worked at Touche Ross, another large
firm in the accounting/consuiting field. Plaintiff's husband
also worked at Touche, and she left because the firm had a rule
that prevented both husband and wife from being considered for
partnership. Her husband became a partner at Touche shortly
after her departure.
hen plaintiff initially applied at Price Waterhouse in
1978, she was told that the firm had a rule against employing
anyone whose spouse was a partner in a competing firm, but that
the rule had been waived as to her. In 1981, however, plaintiff
was advised that she would not be eligible for partnership at
Price Waterhouse because her husband was a partner at Touche
Ross. She threatened to resign, and the matter was resolved only
when  laintiff's husband left Touche to set up his own firm,
whereupon Price Waterhouse relented and said that she could be
considered for partnership.
-I This state ent is rel tively brief ard sets forth only those f cts
pertinent to plaintiff's a peal on the issue of relief. We will anplif  the
facts in o r brief as cross-appellee if, as expected, Price  aterhouse
attempts to challenge  he district co rt's liability determinaticn. Because
the basic facts outlined herein are not disputed, we generally p ovide
citations ally w en quoting the court's opinion or the transcript of
proceedings at trial (hereafter Tr.).
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In sum, plaintiff came to Price Waterhouse expressly because
of her interest in becoming a partner, which   through no fault
of her own   she could not realize at Touche Ross. She remaine 
at Price Waterhouse only upon being assured that she had a real
opportunity to become a partner there.
2 . The Partnership Decisions
At the time of this litigation, Price Waterhouse had 662
partners, of whom 7 were women. 2d Partnership decisions at the
firm are made nationally by the governing Policy Board following
a review of materials relating to candidates nominated by local
offices; these materials include written comments on candidates
made by individual partners.
Plaintiff had a strikingly successful record in securing and
managing new business for Price Waterhouse -- upwards of $40
million   and in August 1982 her office initiated the formal
partnership process by nominating her for partnership effective
July 1, 1983. As the court below found, "there is no li itation
on the number of partners who may be selected in any one year,"
618 F.Supp. at 1111 (RE 8), and at the time plaintiff was
nominated, 88 candidates were under consideration   87 men and
her. None of the men had produced as much business or billed as
many hours as she had, and her clients were "very pleased" with
her wor . Id. at 1112 (RE 11).
In March 1983, the Policy Board determined that 47 of the
male candidates would be admitted to partnership. Of the 41
d Two of  he  omen were a  itted after pl intiff began the
administrative process challenging her rejection.
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ca didates not admitted, 21 were rejected, and 20   including
olaintiff   were placed on "hold" an  were eligible for
renomination. Four men of the 20 were put on two-year holds.
In August 1983, all 15 men who had been placed on a one-year
hold were again nominated for partnershi  by their offices, as
were two of the four men on two-year holds. Of these 17
candidates who were reconsidered, 15 were admitted to
partn rship. Plaintiff, however, was not renominated. Instead,
she was advised that it was "very unlikely" that she would ever
become a partner at Price Waterhouse. _Id_, at 1113 (RE 12). She
was told that she could remain at the firm as a manager, but a
senior partner in her office advised her to resign. _§/ And in
f ct the regular practice is for candidates rejected for
partnership to leave; thus, of the 122 candidates turned down in
the period 1978-1983, only 9 were with the firm as of 1984. -i/
Plaintiff left Price Waterhouse in January 1984 and immediately
set up her own consulting firm.
3. P etrial Proceedings
Following the lodging of charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the issuance by the Commission of the
stat tory notice of right to sue, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1),
l intiff filed a com laint on September 28, 1984, alleging that
Price Waterhouse had denied her admission to partnership because
3/ Tr. 416.
1/ PI. Ex. 10 (Ex. C).
l¬
ot her sax.  ! Discovery moved quickly and generally smoothly.
price Waterhouse declined, however, to furnish earnings data on
its partners as requested by plaintiff, stating that it believed
that such data would be needed "only in connection with a damages
determination," i.e., only after a finding of liability.
Plaintiff's attorneys were sympathetic with the firm's
reluctance unnecessarily to disclose its partners' earnings, and
it appeared possible that the parties might be able to agree on
monetary relief should there be a finding of liability. For
these reasons, the cover document in plaintiff's pretrial
pac age, which was han ed up to the trial judge at the pretrial
conference on March 14, 1985, set forth defendant's reluctance to
furnish earnings data unless required by a finding of liability,
as well as the possibility of agreement on relief if
discrimination  as found. Plaintiff concluded by saying that, in
the absence of such agreement, "it may be necessary to make a
further submission to the Court, although an evidentiary hearing
may not be needed" (RE 37). The trial court did not enter a
formal pretrial order, but we believed that the court accepted
the approach outlined in plaintiff's pretrial package.
4. The District Court's Decision
Following a four and one-half day trial, voluminous post¬
trial briefs, and closing argument, the district court on
September 20, 1985 issued a Memorandum in which it found that
/ Plaintiff also charge  that the firm had retaliated against  er by
harassing her after she first filed a charge with EEOC. She drop e  this
claim at trial.
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Price  aterhouse's refusal to admit plaintiff to partnership was
attributable to her sex. The court decline  to order that
plaintiff be admitted to membership in the firm, ho ever, saying
that her resignation in January 1984 precluded such relief since
it was not a constructive discharge. The court also declined to
award back pay for the period between July 1, 1983   when she
should  ave become a partner   and her departure in January
1984, because no evidence on partners' earnings had been
presented. The court acknowledged that the "parties have
represented that they had agreed to defer questions of relief
until liability was resolved, 618 F.Supp. at 1121 (RE 33-34), but
said that this  as done  ithout the court's knowledge or consent
and would not be permitted. _ /
In finding liability, the district court accepted
plaintiff's central argument: "that she was not evaluated as a
manager, but as a woman manager, based on a sexual stereotype
that  rompts [so e] males to regard assertive behavior in women
as being more offensive and intolerable than comparable behavior
in men because some men do not re ard it as appropriate
eminine behavior." Id. at 1116 (RE 21). This argument was
grounded on an intensive exa ination of myriad documents related
to the admissions process   including candidate evaluations
tendered by individual partners   and was supported by the
. ¦ ie ccutt also a rded attorneys' fees an  costs to plaintiff and
directed the   rties to attempt to agree on the amount. They  ere unable to
do this, despite defendant's stipulation that Price Waterhouse "does not
can test the reasonableness of the hours e pende , the hourly rates for
counsel, or the expenses incurred." In view of the filing of cross-appeals,
the court below entered an order daferring resolution of the fee issue.
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tastimony of Dr. Susan Fiske,   social pyscliologist whom the
court below called a "well qualified expert." Id. -at 1117 (re
23 ) .
The trial court s opinion details the evidence supporting
its finding of liability, but two points are especially
instructive. The first is the advice plaintiff got from  homas
Beyer, the man "responsible, for telling her what problems the
Policy Board had identified with her candidacy." Id. (RE 22).
Beyer counseled plaintiff to "wal  more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry." _ld. This advice had nothing to do
ith plaintiff's professional bearing or appearance   she was
always well turned out   but it had everything to do with her
sex. This is the closest that one is ever li ely to come to a
smoking gun" in a case involving sophisticated professionals.
Second, the partners themselves knew what was going on; as the
court found, plaintiff's "[sjupporters indicated that her critics
judged her harshly due to her sex." Id. (RE 21).
In light of all the evidence, the court found that "the
Policy Board's decision not to admit the plaintiff to partnership
was tainted by discriminatory evaluations that were the direct
result of its failure to address the evident problem of sexual
stereotyping in partners' evaluations." JCd. at 1120 (RE 30).
Having found that discrimination contributed to plaintiff's
rejection, the court then placed the burden on Price Waterhouse
to prove that she would not have been admitted to partnership
even in a bias-free setting. See Day v. Math ws, 530 F.2d 1083
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(D.C.Cir. 1976). The court found t at t e firm had not met this
burden. 618 F. Supp. at 1120 (RE 31).
Ordinarily, this finding of liability would have entitled
plaintiff to equitable relief. As noted above, however, the
court ruled that her resignation from Price Waterhouse precluded
prospective relief and that the absence of earnings data barred
an award of back pay. 2J
Supporting the trial court's decision on the merits but
believing that further relief should have been granted, plaintiff
filed a timely appeal of the decision below. Defendant then
filed a timely cross-appeal.
ARGUMENT
I TRODUCTION  ND SUMMARY
After  nn Hopkins was first passed over for partnership at
Price Waterhouse in early 1983, the partner-in-charge of her
office told her that to improve her chances for admission she
should "wal  more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry." 618 F.Supp. at 1117 (RE 22). Faced with this and a
host of similar evidence   as well as credible expert testimony
-- the district court properly found that discrimination based on
sex played a role in the firm's refusal to make her a partner.
'll As also noted abo e (n.6), the court granted attorneys' fees and
costs to plaintiff.
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It was theThis case was unique in two import nt respects,
first suit to challenge a partnership refusal on the merits after
t e Supreme Court ruled in Hishon v. King & Spalding,
U.S.   , 104 S.Ct. 2228 (1984), that  dmission to p rtnership is
covered toy Title VII. And it  as the first case to challenge an
employ ent decision made in a collective or collegial fashion by
a large number of individuals, as opposed to a decision made by a
single corporate (or governmental) official or a small group.
The collegial nature of the partnership admissions process
at Price Waterhouse   it can be likened to that of a college
fraternity   posed special problems of proof. The firm tried to
lay on these, suggesting that it was not possible to assign
responsibility for plaintiff 's rejection to any particular
partner, despite the clear evidence of discrimination in the
selection procedure. The court below rejected defendant's effort
to abdicate responsibility, however, finding that "the
maintenance of a system that gave  eight to ... biased criticisms
as a conscious act of the partnershi  as a whole, " and that the
firm "should have been aware" of the proclivity for
discrimination in that system. 618 F.Supp.  t 1119 (RE 28). More
specifically, the court fo nd that:
Comments influenced by sex stereotypes were
made by partners; the fir 's evaluation
process gave substantial weight to these
com ents; and the p rtnership failed to
address the cons icuous problem of
stereotyping in partnership evaluations.
Id. at 1120 (RE 30).
The district court's findings are firmly rooted in the
evidence and are not assailable. Anderson v. Bessemer City,
-10-
U.S.  , 105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985). Given t ese findings, as well
as its ultimate finding that plaintiff's rejection was "tainted
by discriminatory evaluations that were the direct result of
[Price Waterhouse's] failure to address the evident problem of
sexual stereotyping in partners' evaluations," 618 F.Supp. at
1120 (RE 30), the court applied well established law and shifted
e burden to defendant to prove that plaintiff would not have
been admitted even in the absence of discrimination. Day v.
Mathews, supra, 530 F.2d at 1085-1086; Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d
1364, 1366 (D.C.Cir. 1983).  he court found that defendant had
not made the requisite showing, and this finding is also
supported by the evidence and is immunized from challenge.
Bessemer City, supra.
Once liability was determined, full equitable relief should
have b en awarded. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975). The district court declined to grant full relief,
however, holding that plaintiff's resignation from Price
Waterhouse precluded an injunction directing her admission. This
ruling misapplied t e law of constructive discharge, and it also
erroneously assumed that the only prospective relief available to
plaintiff was admission to the partnership.
This Court need not reach the issue of constructive
discharge, since the nature of the position sought by plaintiff
is such that the doctrine cannot be meaningfully applied to it.
In any event, plaintiff satisfied all requirements for invoking
constructive discharge. She had been passed over for partnership
not once but twice. More significant, she was told that it was
"very unlikely" that she would realize her career ambition. In
short, plaintiff was confronted not with a single denial of
promotion but with a roadbloc  to all further advancement. She
as at the end of the line at Price Waterhouse, and the firm told
her so. In the district judge's apt phrase, plaintiff "could
stay and hope that lightning would strike ... or [she] could
quit . " _ /
To be sure, plaintiff could have remained at the firm as a
manager, i.e., a member of the staff. But one of the senior
partners in her office advised her to resign, and in fact the
regular practice is for candidates rejected for  artnership to
leave the firm. With these facts   all of which are undisputed
the proper legal conclusion was that "a reasonable person in
[plaintiff's] position and circumstances would have felt
com elled to resign." Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate
School District, 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981). Hence
constructive discharge was established.
Gi en the importance of partners generally being able to get
along with one another, as well as the animosity that sometimes
attends EEO claims, it may be that the court below felt reluctant
to order Price Waterhouse to make Ann Hopkins a  artner even
given the finding of discrimination. But admission to
partnership  as not the only option. A district court has
discretion to consider monetary relief in lieu of reinstatement
if the court believes that there may be a problem with senior
/  r. 138.
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officials working toget er. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp.,
742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984). Thus the district court might
legitimately have declined to ma e plaintiff a partner, but it
could not refuse to grant any prospective relief. This was error
and requires remand.
Finally, the district court refused to award back pay for
the p riod when plaintiff should have b come a  artner   July 1
1983   until her resignation in January 1984, because no
evidence was  resented at trial on partners' earnings. This case
presented important issues as to liability, and both parties
believed that the trial should focus on that issue. In large
art, this was because of Price Waterhouse's extreme reluctance
to release any data on partners ' earnings unless compelled to do
so by a fi ding of discrimination, in which case the parties
might have been able to agree on monetary relief.
Plaintiff set tnis out in her pretrial statement, and her
attorneys  istakenly thought that the court understood and agreed
to this approach, which was endorsed by both parties (see RE
37). since a remand is requir d on the issue of prospective
relief, however, this should also include the issue of back p y.
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FULL RELIEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GR NTED TO THE PLAINTIFF
A. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Some Form
of Prospective Re lie?
Ann Hopkins was t ice passed over for partnership   first
in Marc  1983 when she  as placed on "hold," and again in August
1983 when her office declined to renominate her. At that point,
she was told that there was virtually no chance that she would
ever become a partner.
On hearing testimony about this, the trial judge remar ed:
They said you could stay and not be a
partner. You could stay and hope that
lightning would strike ... or you could quit.
Tr. 138. This was a particularly graphic and compelling
depiction of plaintiff's plight, and the court later encapsulated
it in finding that "the plaintiff was advised that it was very
unlikely that she would be admitted to partnership." 618 F.Supp.
at 1113 (RE 12). This finding is strongly supported by the
evidence and, indeed, w s not contested by Price Waterhouse.
Despite this finding, the district court denied plaintiff
prospective relief in the form of admission to partnership, on
the ground she was not forced out of Price Waterhouse and could
have remained at the firm as a manager-for-life. As we read the
court's opinion, plaintiff would have been entitled to
rospective relief follo ing her departure from Price Waterhouse
only if she had intentionally been driven out. But if she could
have remained at the firm, then she had to do so if she wanted
future relief. This was true even though becoming partner was
-14-
sr career ambition, her only hope of making partner was that
-lightning would stri e," a senior partner in her office advised
er to leave, and the established practice at the firm was for
candidates rejected for partnership to resign. It was not
logical or equitable to require plaintiff to remain  ith the firm
in these circumstances in order to get prospective relief.
Nothing in the law requires this.
In making this argument, we do not wish to denigrate the
broad practical im lications of the district court s decision.
For plaintiff herself, the damage to reputation that may
accompany denial of partnership has been repaired. For women
(and minority group mem ers) at Price Waterhouse and other large
firms, the road to  artnership will unquestionably be smoother as
a result of this ruling. And any employer who would permit
se ual or racial stereotypes to i fluence employment decisions
no  knows that this cannot be done. These are significant
results that alone would have warranted bringing this suit.
But full relief for plaintiff was not granted, and she was
entitled to that, too. One of the central purposes of Title VII
is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra,
422 U.S. at 418. That " ake whole" purpose was not achieved
here.
In denying prospective relief to the plaintiff, the court
oelow purported to rely on the principle of constructive
discharge. See Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172-1173
(D.C.Cir. 1981). This doctrine has developed in situations in
-15-
which t ere has been an allegation of a discriminatory denial of
promotion at one rung of a long career ladder, or a charge of an
improper disparity in pay. See, e.g., Clark v. Marsh; Bourque v.
Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980). In such
circumstances, there may be no objective reason for an employee
to believe that the initial discriminatory action will be
r  licated later, and hence no reason to thin  that the action
ill have more than a short term effect on the employee's career
otential. Given such facts, it may well be sensible to say that
"society and the  olicies underlying Title VII will be best
served if ... unlawful discrimination is attacked within the
context of existing em loyment relationships." Bourque, supra,
617 F.2d at  6.
Constructive discharge analysis is not germane, however, to
career making (or breaking) decisions, such as those involving
partnership or university tenure. One who is rejected for
artnershi  or tenure normally will seek to pursue his or her
career goals elsewhere, and society derives no value from
requiring such individuals to stay where they are simply to
pursue a Title VII claim.
The positions of manager and partner at Price Waterhouse are
qualitatively different in terms of career potential (unlike,
e.g.,  romotion from GS-12 to 13). Thus the proper analogy is
with a rejection for initial hire, rather than a promotion. If a
black person sought hire into a high paying actuarial position
and instead  as offered a low paying, low potential job as a
bookkeeper, he would not be required to take the bookkee er job
-16-
in order to maintain a Title VII action aimed at becoming an
actuary. Instead, the relevant inquiry is mitigation of da ages,
which is far different than entitlement to relief per se.
Si ilarly, the fact that plaintiff left Price Waterhouse may have
a bearing on the precise amount of relief owed her, but not on
her right to relief in the first instance.  l Constructive
discharge analysis is simply not meaningful here.
But even assuming constructive discharge provides the proper
analytical framework, plaintiff is still entitled to full
r lief. In Clark v. Marsh, this Court held that a single
instance of discrimination, without more, will rarely provide the
basis for a finding of constructive discharge; in addition, there
must be "aggravating factors." But it is not required, as the
court below apparently believed, that the employer deliberately
undertake to make the employee quit. Rather,
[t]o find constructive discharge, the court
determines whether or not a reasonable person
in the employee's position and circumstances
would have felt compelled to resign. *** The
employee thus does not have to prove it was
the employer's purpose to force the employee
to resign.
Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School District, supra,
644 F.2d at 1077 (citations omitted). _  / see also Bourque,
supra, 617 F.2d at 65; Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d
885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).
9/
When plaintiff left Price  aterhouse, she immediately set up her o n
consulting firm.




In the present case, it was reasonable for plaintiff to
resign from Price Waterhouse. This was what other rejected
partnership candidates at the firm almost invariably did. It
what a senior partner in her office advised her to do. And
plaintiff's rejection was not merely a "professional
disappointment," as the district court characterized it. 618
F.Supp. at 1121 (RE 32). Instead a career thwarting obstacle had
been placed in her path, and the very goal she had set in working
at Price Waterhouse had been rendered unobtainable. In these
circumstances, plaintiff's only reasonable choice was to pursue
her career elsewhere; she had no other realistic option and in
that very real sense reasonably felt compelled to leave. Just as
in Clar  v. Mars , 665 F.2d at 1174, "[p]laintiff was . . .
essentially locked into a position from which she could
apparently obtain no relief." If anything, it would have been
unreasonable for plaintiff to have remained at the fir    and to
have put her career on hold   simply to pursue a claim in an
uncharted area of the law.
This  ould be a different case if plaintiff had retained a
realistic chance of becoming a partner, but had left anyway. It
might then make sense to say that she had not shown constructive
discharge and he ce was not entitled to prospective relief. But
that is not the situation here,  here the trial judge himself
analogized her situation to waiting for lightning to strike.
Title VII does not require its victims to risk such odds in order
to secure full relief. Nor does the Act require a victim to
choose between pursuing a career or seeking complete vindication
-18-
under t e law.
The district co rt's discussion of prospective relief
focuses on the possitoility of ordering plaintiff's admission to
partnership. It is possible that the court belie ed that
admission was inappropriate given the importance of partners
generally getting along with one another and in view of the
animosity that sometimes attends EEO claims. Assuming that these
considerations properly apply to a nationwide firm with over 650
partners who meet but once a year, the court would have had
discretion to decline to make plaintiff a partner. But if this
had happened, plaintiff would then have been entitled to
alternative relief in the form of "front pay." Whittlesey v.
Union Carbide Corp., supray Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co.,
supra ? Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th
Cir. 1980). 11/
In  hittlesey, the Second Circuit explained that:
Reinstatement ... may not always be
possible. For example, there may be no
position available for plaintiff at the time
of judgment ... or, as  as the case here, the
employer-employee relationship may have been
irreparably damaged by animosity associated
ith the litigation ...
Denial of reinstatement in those
situations, without an award of reasonable,
off-setting compensation, would leave the
plaintiff irreparably harmed in the future by
the employer's discriminatory discharge, and
Whittlesey and Goss arose un er the  ge Discrimination in Bnployirent
y t, 29 U.S.C. 621 et ssq., but  he same basic stan ards govern relief under
f tle VII and  he ADEA. Spagnuolo v.  hirlpool Oorp., 717 F.2d 114, 11 -120
n-3 (4 h Cir. 1983).    4 
-19-
would permit the defendant's liability for
its unla ful action to end at the time of
judgment. To prevent this injustice a
reasonable monetary award of front pay is
necessary ...
742 F.2d at 728 (citations omitted).
In sum, the district court com itted legal error in refusing
to order some form of prospective relief after finding Price
Waterhouse liable for discrimination. This case should therefore
be remanded for entry of appropriate relief.
B. Plaintiff Is Also Entitled to Back Pay
Counsel for both parties reasonably believed that the
district court had agreed that precise data on partners' earnings
ould be provided only upon a finding of liability, and only if
the parties themselves were unable to agree upon relief (see RE
37). Price Waterhouse was understandably reluctant to have
information on earnings in the record unless and until the
question of relief was reached. Given the novelty of the factual
setting and the fact that the case was tried without a jury,
oreover, it was natural that the parties focused their attention
on the issue of liability.
In these circumstances, and particularly in view of the
necessity for a remand on the issue of prospective relief, the
question of bach pay should also be revisited. That issue is
unlikely to require live testimony. See, e.g., Caviale v.
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social S rvices, 744 F.2d
1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1984) ("As we read the record, the parties
focused the trial proceeding on the issue of liability and
-20-
apparently contemplated further proceedings in the event
lia ility  as established. *** We accordingly remand the cause
to the district court with instructions to conduct additional
proceedings and determine the scope of [plaintiff's] relief"). - ?/
CONCLUSION
Ann Hopkins pro ed, and the district court found, that Price
Waterhouse discriminated on the basis of sex by excluding her
from partnership. Plaintiff  as entitled to full equitable
relief, since her resignation was compelled by the firm's action
in foreclosing the very career opportunities that had brought her
there and  ept her there.
We ask that the district court's finding of liability be
affirmed, that the court's ruling as to remedy be vacated, and
i / See also Daugherty v. Barry,  os. 82-1687, 83-0314 (D.D.C. April 30,
1985), appe l p nding,  os. 85-5715, 85-5716, an EEC case in vAiich the
istrict court, upon fin ing that plaintiffs   re entitled to certain monetary
relief, established the formula for such relief and stated: "Plaintiffs have
not provided sufficient information to enable the Court to make  hese
calculations. T erefore,  he parties are instructe  to com ute the exact
amount of damages owed by defendants, based on the Court's abo e directive"
(slip c . at 39).  his method of procee ing, which is not a formal
ifurcation, is not unco  on in errployment discrimination cases. What is
involved is a mathenatical calculation derived from  arnings recor s for a
spacific time perio .
-21-
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